Mobile dating applications such as Coffee Meets Bagel, Tantan, and Tinder, have become significant for young adults to meet new friends and discover romantic relationships. From a system designer's perspective, in order to achieve better user experience in these applications, we should take both the efficiency and fairness of a dating market into consideration, so as to increase the overall satisfaction for all users. Towards this goal, we investigate the nature of diminishing marginal returns for online dating markets (i.e., captured by the submodularity), and trade-off between the efficiency and fairness of the market with Nash social welfare. We further design effective online algorithms to the apps. We verify our models and algorithms through sound theoretical analysis and empirical studies by using real data and show that our algorithms can significantly improve the ecosystems of the online dating applications.
INTRODUCTION
Online dating applications are more and more ubiquitous and becoming an integral part of young adults' everyday lives. These applications 1 , such as Coffee Meets Bagel [1] , Tantan [2] , and Tinder [3] , provide platforms for people to make new friends with various purposes including meeting new friends and developing personal or romantic relationships. The report in [4] shows that the percentage of online dating users in the USA triples (i.e., from 5% to 15%) from 2013 to 2016. Tinder consistently ranks as one of the top 10 grossing apps in Apple's online store, with more than 50 million active users [5] . It is also reported that Coffee Meets Bagel has created 997 million matches and more than 50, 000 happy couples in long-standing relationships [6] . Tantan claims 60 million registered users, of which 6 million are active on a daily basis [7] .
Behind the great success of the online dating apps is the double opt-in design, which provides the users with appealing online dating experiences: For instance, all of the above three apps present potential matches with profile cards that a user can swipe through within the app. Each profile card includes a deck of photos and an optional text-based biography. Each user has two main activities: pass (i.e., a "swipe-left") and like (i.e., a "swipe-right") on the profile cards. These dating apps only notify the users when both sides like each other (i.e., referred to as a match). Only matched users can start conversations. The double opt-in design turns the complex, anxious, and a sometimes awkward act of introducing oneself to another person into a simple yet playful experience [8] . This design motivates users to discover more profiles and get more matches.
To achieve better user experience in these emerging dating apps, a system designer should consider both efficiency and fairness of the dating markets. Efficiency means that the apps should make as many matches as possible in the market. This is similar to maximizing the social welfare.
In the meantime, we should also consider fairness of the dating market, which is often ignored by the designers of the apps. Most dating apps follow the freemium strategy, in which the basic features are free to all, while the paying users get premium services. Examples of premium services include Tinder Boost, Tinder Plus and Coffee Meets Bagel Woo. The dating apps give more preferences to the paying users. However, these preferences may introduce unfairness, causing the non-paying users more difficult to get matches. For example, those who use Boost will have much more opportunities to be shown to others and hence get more matches than those who do not. A more "fair" situation is that the app should help both active paying users and non-paying users get a number of matches.
Keeping the non-paying users a number of matches is important to the system designer as it leads to higher retention: We analyze the correlation between the users' retention rates and number of matches based on the data from online dating apps. We find that users with few matches (usually, these are "less attractive users") are often frustrated, hence they tend to become inactive with low retention rates (We show the detailed analysis in Section 3.2).
Each online dating application is a sophisticated ecosystem resulting from the interactions of many factors. To better understand the fairness problems discussed above, we classify the factors into two categories: the uncontrollable factors (i.e., mainly determined by the user's attractiveness), and the controllable factors (i.e., caused by the policies and algorithms used in the app). For the uncontrollable factors, there exists a natural and intrinsic unfairness as a consequence of the attractiveness for people's appearance. Moreover, it is reported in [9] that users tend to pursue attractive users regardless of their own appearance in online dating. This tendency causes that a small group of attractive users can get matches much more easily than others. For the controllable factors, Tinder and some other online dating apps can control each recommendation by showing a user's profile card to another or not. Furthermore, the dating apps can also control the privileges to the paying users, so as to trade-off the revenue and the fairness of the dating market. In this work, we only focus on the discussion of the controllable factors: to improve both efficiency and fairness for the online dating ecosystems based on economic models and online algorithm design. We show that our algorithms can significantly improve the efficiency and fairness of the online dating market, and the online dating apps can use them to relieve the effect of the uncontrollable factors to provide better user experiences.
Existing studies such as [10] [11] and [12] observe the imbalanced distributions of matches on Tinder, implying the importance of fairness. However, they do not propose sound solutions to the problem.
It is challenging to design and implement an online dating market to be both efficient and fair. There are three key challenges to overcome. First, the objectives of efficiency and fairness do not often align with each other. It is difficult to present appropriate performance metric to trade off these objectives within one systematic framework. Second, the algorithms deployed for the apps should run fast enough and scale to enormous user activities. For example, Tinder processes billions of events per day, generating terabytes of data [8] , hence a slow algorithm degrades the user's experience significantly. Last but not least, the algorithms should be online to deal with unpredictable user activities. The online requirement is important because it is hard to predict when the users begin/stop swiping; how many profile cards they will swipe on. Furthermore, their preferences for matches may also vary over time.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to present a generalized model to achieve both efficient and fair online dating markets based on the data-driven studies, with the goal of designing fast online algorithms:
First, we present a systematic and generalized model for the dating markets to trade off the objectives between efficiency and fairness. We find the match goal based on the correlation between users' retention rates and number of matches from data of online dating apps, and discover the property of diminishing marginal returns for the online dating markets. We further set up match goals for different user groups, and define the utility function to measure the satisfaction for each user in the dating app. Then we present the objective function to maximize the overall satisfaction (i.e., welfare) in the market, which indicates both efficiency and fairness.
Second, by discovering the diminishing marginal returns when a user gets more and more matches, we reduce our problem to the online submodular welfare maximization problem. Then we present a 1 2 -competitive online greedy algorithm to solve the problem. We further show that the online greedy algorithm is effective both in theory and practice.
Third, we adapt the Nash social welfare to the online dating markets, which provides a natural balance between efficiency and fairness. We further reduce the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare to a special case of the submodular welfare optimization, and adjust our online algorithm to solve the problem.
Last but not least, we present data-driven empirical studies to evaluate the performance of our model by using the data from an online dating app. To this goal, we define generalized performance metrics, as well as discuss the selection of appropriate utility functions and parameters. More interestingly, we discover an equilibrium when we are evaluating the performance of Nash social welfare. The equilibrium indicates a market configuration where both non-paying users and paying users are satisfied. Finally, we evaluate the improvement of applying the Nash social welfare by comparing the performance with the distributions of our dataset. The results show significant improvement for both efficiency and fairness by using Nash social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss related work in Section 2 and present the problem model in Section 3. Next, we reduce the problem to the online submodular welfare maximization problem and present an efficient online algorithm to solve it in Section 4. Then we discuss how to leverage the Nash social welfare to the context of online dating markets in Section 5. Finally, we present the effectiveness of our approaches based on data-driven studies in Section 6. We conclude the paper and present the open questions for future work in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
The online dating market has attracted broad and interdisciplinary research interest in social networking, communications, economics and even psychology, sociology and anthropology.
Online dating applications. In recent years, the studies for online dating apps emerge both in academia and social media [6] [10] . Researchers study the user motivations [13] [14] , social impacts [15] [16] , and privacy issues [17] for online dating. They also investigate the gender differences between males and females, including different selection strategies [18] [12] , as well as conversation behaviors [19] .
Some research uses economic models to analyze user behavior for the dating markets, [20] investigates an economic matching model to explain the matching patterns and evaluate the efficiency of the matches. The authors in [9] analyze and predict the user preferences in online dating based on data-driven studies.
Some articles demonstrate the imbalanced distributions of the matches in online dating, and shows that it is hard for some less attractive males to get a match [10] [11] . The authors of [12] further present a hypothesis of the "feedback loop" in the online dating market: The males are forced to be less selective in the hope of getting a match, while females are becoming more selective, as they know that any males they like will result in a match with high probabilities. All these findings imply that fairness is a crucial factor to consider for the online dating apps. Two-sided Markets: models and algorithms. The online dating market is typical two-sided (matching) market [21] . To better understand the models and challenges of the online dating market, we compare it to other two-sided markets. One is the well-studied online ride-sharing market (e.g., Uber and Lyft) [22] [23] [24] . Much simpler than the online dating market, the online ride-sharing market is based on a centralized matching design, in which the market maker (i.e., the platform) decides all matches. However, in the online dating market, the platform only recommends potential matches by showing profile cards, and all the (swiping) activities from the users are uncontrollable by the platform.
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Another similar two-sided market is the online advertising market, such as Google's Adwords [25] . The authors in [26] summarizes various models and fundamental online algorithms for the online advertising market. [27] presents theoretical studies to design online ad allocation algorithms to achieve both efficiency and fairness. Methodologies. Submodular welfare maximization is a framework for resource allocation with decreasing marginal utilities. Existing studies investigate the complexity [28] [29] , offline algorithms [30] [31] , and online algorithms [26] [32] [33] [34] .
Nash social welfare is a sound criterion to trade off between efficiency and fairness, which is first proposed by John Nash [35] . Recently, researchers figure out the its properties in [36] [37] [38] . They also design offline algorithms to maximize the Nash social welfare with different settings in [39] [40] [41] [42] . We will discuss more details of the methodologies in Section 4 and 5.
MARKET, OBSERVATIONS, AND MODELS
In this section, we present the model of each user's utility (i.e., degree of satisfaction) in online dating apps based on our results from data-driven studies. We first introduce the preliminaries for the market configurations of online dating. Then we analyze the correlations between users' retention rate and number of matches by using the data from a popular online dating app, and discover the match goal (i.e., expected number of matches within a period) from our results. We further define each user's utility by his match goal and actual matches. Finally, we formulate our objective function, which maximizes the total degrees of satisfaction for all users.
Market Configurations for Online Dating
The online dating market consists of two groups, and we call them male and female. Both groups behave the same way in the market. In this paper, we only consider the matches happening between the two groups. We consider a dating market with M male and F female users. We adopt the convention [X ] = {1, 2, . . . , X } to denote the set of X elements throughout the paper, e.g., [M] = {1, 2, · · · , M } is the set of all males and [F ] = {1, 2, · · · , F } is that of all females.
To simplify the discussion, we divide time into fixed-length time slots that we call rounds. We consider a user active in round t if he/she swipes at least once in round t.
Note that as both groups are in symmetry in most of our discussions, without loss of generality, we focus on the algorithms for recommending males to females in this paper, and the other side works the same way.
We also define the number of swipes (or the number of profiles reviewed) in round t as the (swiping) capacity of the user in that round. We denote the capacity of a male m or a female f in round t as c
Estimate achieved matches. To estimate the number of achieved matches for each user, we take a closer look at the match making process under the double opt-in model.The app has a mechanism to estimate the probability of whether female f will swipe right (i.e., like) on a male m in round t. We denote the estimation asp scope of the paper, and we only take the predicted probabilities as our input.
We further define the match score at round t as the product of the predicted (like) probabilities in both directions, i.e. w
. Intuitively, the match score captures the degree of the mutual-likes between a pair of users. When we recommend male m to female f at round t, the probability of a match achieved between m and f is w
. The decision variable is whether the online dating app should recommend m to f at round t, denoted as a binary variable
. To sum up, we estimate the expectation of achieved match of male m at round t as follows:
(1)
Finding the Match Goal
Retentions vs. matches. To discover the insights of the online dating market, and explore how the number of matches influences users' satisfaction in online dating. We analyze the correlations between the retention rate and the number of matches per week. In practice, the retention rate is a sound and widely-used indicator, providing us with quantitative measurements of users' satisfaction, as a user tends to continue using the app if he is satisfied. We collect two weeks' activity data for the users from a popular online dating app. For each user, we count his matches during the first week, and count his retention as a binary of whether he opens the app during the second week, that is, with 1 indicating a "yes", and 0 for "no". Then the question is: What is the probability of a user to use the app (i.e., retention rate) in the second week with a given number of matches during the first week? Figure 1 shows the correlation between the (normalized) retention rate and the (normalized) number of matches for both male and female users 2 . The x-axis is the (normalized) number of matches received by a user in the first week, and the y-axis is the (normalized) average retention rate 3 (i.e., whether they opens the app in the second week) of the users with the corresponding number of matches. Due to the confidentiality of the data, we normalize the retention rate by dividing each average retention rate by males' average retention rate with no match. The two solid curves in Figure 1 illustrate the correlation between retention rates and number of matches. We limit the range of x-axis (i.e., the number of matches) to {0, 1, 2, · · · , 20}, as the curves for both males and the females stay flat when the number of weekly matches exceeds 20. Moreover, the two vertical dotted lines show the median number of weekly matches for both males and females.
From the data, we have the following key observations based on the relationships between the retention rate and the number of weekly matches for both males and females:
• A male's retention rate increases fast when he gets a new match with less than 7 matches during the week. When a male user gets more than 7 matches. The retention rate stays stable.
• The average number of matches for a male user is about 5, and the median is 1 (i.e., half of the males have less than 1 match in the first week). If we improve a male's number of matches from 0 to 7, the retention rate will triple. If we improve it from 1 to 7, the retention rate will also improve as high as 65%, which indicates that helping each male user get one match per day, will increase the retention rate by 65% for half of the males. Meanwhile, improving the a male's number of matches from the median level to the average level will also increase his retention rate by 49%.
• However, the effect of improving the number of matches for females is not significant. The average number of matches for a female user is about 15, and the median is 7. The slope of the curve for females after the median (i.e., 7) is much more moderate. Moreover, even if we improve a female's number of matches from 7 to 20, the retention rate will only increase 27%.
Based on the above observations, we have the following conclusions: 1) For both males and females, more matches lead to a higher retention rate. 2) We find that the males' retention rate is much more sensitive than that of females in terms of number of matches, as the number of matches for females is much more optimistic. 3) Improving the weekly number of matches for each male to about 7 (i.e., we call this the magic number for males' matches) will promote the males' retention rate significantly. In the meantime, if a male gets more matches than the magic number, then the improvement of his retention rate is rather modest. 4) The retention curves for both males and females are concave, indicating the diminishing marginal returns when a user gradually gets more matches, and we will discuss the details in Section 4. 5) Our observations also illustrate why we care much more on males' numbers of matches, as the improvement of retention rate is moderate even though we promote females' number of matches a lot from the current level.
To give a formal definition of the observed magic number for following theoretical studies, we introduce the concept of the match goal for the males as follows:
Match goal. For a male m ∈ [M] using the dating app, we define his match goal as д (t ) m in round t, which is his expectation for the number of matches in that round. In practice, we can set the length for each round as one day, or set the length for each round as a week if we consider the seasonality factor for a user to get a match. This is because the distribution of matches for the online dating apps varies over the days of the week, as there are both more male and female users online on weekends than weekdays. It is easier for a user to get a match on Saturday night than Monday morning. For a common non-paying user on the app, the system can set his match goal as one match per day (or 7 to 8 matches per week), that is, a non-paying user will be happy to get one match per day. For a paying user (e.g., a Tinder Boost user) or a new user, the system can set a higher match goal for him (e.g., 2 to 4 matches per day), since a paying user deserves more matches and a new user is more motivated when getting more matches when he starts to use the app. In practice, we can also dynamically adjust the match goals in different regions, as the market configurations may vary.
A user's match goal is an estimation for his expectation of matches set by the system. To capture the differences between the match goal and the actual matches of a (male) user m, we also define the achieved matches, a
Problem Formulation
Satisfaction and utility function. We define each user's degree of satisfaction (i.e., s m is used to distinguish the priorities for different users.
Note that the value of each w . To simplify the model, we can further assume that the utility functions are symmetric over different males in all rounds, such that u
Objective. Our objective function is to maximize the overall weighted degrees of satisfaction for males (i.e., (3)), subjected to the (swiping) capacity constraint for each female (i.e., (4a)), and the (swiping) capacity constraint for each male (i.e., (4b)):
In practice, when we design the algorithm of recommending males to females, we can neglect the constraint for each male's capacity (i.e., (4b)). This is because it is difficult to estimate each
m by only looking at the females' swiping activities in an online setting, and a male tends to spontaneously increase his (swiping) capacity if he has not get enough matches. However, even though we add constraint (4b), our online algorithm in Section 4 still works by applying the methodologies in [32] .
As we discussed before, we want to mention that the mirroring model and algorithm of recommending females to males throughout this paper is theoretically correct, though practically it impacts the retention much less significantly. In the following section, for concise and practical considerations, we only discuss the algorithms for the recommendations from males to females.
ONLINE SUBMODULAR WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
In the previous section, we define the problem model to maximize the overall degrees of satisfaction of the market (i.e., the welfare).
Based on the results in Section 3.2, the marginal returns (i.e., degree of satisfaction) for each user decrease when he gradually achieves more matches during a certain round. Moreover, when the number of his matches reaches a threshold (e.g., he can hardly keep up with all the conversations with his matches), his utility stops increasing.
Define the Submodularity
We have discovered the property of diminishing marginal returns for online dating markets, to capture this property, we introduce the submodularity in this section. We first define the impression set
, denoting the set of females that the app recommends m to:
It is easy to find that ∀I m ∈ 2 [F ] . Furthermore, we present each user's weighted utility function on impression set (i.e., equivalent to (2)), which is a function defined on 2 [F ] :
We then present the property of submodularity and monotonicity for µ m as follows: 
Furthermore, we say that µ is monotone submodular if additionally, µ m (I (t )
m ) is the marginal utility of m when the app recommends him to one more female f after showing his profile to the females in his impression set I (t ) m , and (7) presents the diminishing marginal returns for m. Additionally, m's utility is non-decreasing when his impression set grows, so µ m is monotone submodular.
As our utility function is monotone submodular, our problem of maximizing the objective function (3) becomes a submodular welfare maximization problem. We summarize existing studies in both offline and online settings. We further present Algorithm 1 and show that it is effective and practical for our app, especially in an online setting.
Solutions: Offline and Online
We first depict the offline and online settings for the online dating apps when we recommend males to females. In an offline setting, we know all the values of inputs such as w
, and µ in advance. Whereas in an online setting, the app presents real-time recommendations to each female f when she arrives with a subset of input values. Some values (e.g.,c
) are not revealed until female f logs into the app and starts swiping, without knowing when a female becomes active/inactive, or her preference over time.
To solve the submodular welfare maximization problem, there is a greedy algorithm that is intuitive but efficient, in which each time we recommend a male m to f with maximum marginal returns, and then update his impression set. The algorithm can solve both offline and online cases. We present the online greedy algorithm in Algorithm 1.
We show that Algorithm 1 is promising both in theory and in practice, by comparing it with existing results for both offline and online settings. Offline setting. In the offline setting, the submodular welfare maximization problem is NP-hard to approximate better than 1 − 1 e [28] , and [30] provides an algorithm in the value oracle model to achieve this bound. [29] proves that beating the 1 − 1 e bound needs exponential communication. [31] proposes a randomized local search algorithm, which is simpler than [30] , also achieving the bound. However, these algorithms have high complexity, and thus are impractical in real-life apps. Online setting. In the online setting, [32] shows that Algorithm 1 achieves a ratio of 1 2 for the online submodular welfare maximization problem even under adversarial input orders. Furthermore, in [33] , the authors proved that there is no (randomized) algorithm achieving a competitive ratio of better than 1 2 for the online submodular welfare maximization problem, unless N P = RP.
In comparison, Algorithm 1 is a solid online algorithm in theory, which guarantees a tight 1 2 -competitive bound for any submodular function µ m .
Time complexity. We then analyze the time complexity for Algorithm 1. For each recommendation of female f , the algorithm goes through M iterations to select the best candidate, so it takes M ·c 
Therefore it is fast enough and practical to apply Algorithm 1 in the app.
NASH SOCIAL WELFARE
To further trade-off the efficiency and fairness, we adapt the Nash social welfare to the online dating markets, which provides a natural balance between the efficiency and fairness.
Definition and Properties
Eq. (8) presents the formulation of Nash social welfare for online dating markets: allocate the recommendations to maximize the geometric mean of the users' utilities (i.e., s
The idea dates back to John Nash's famous solution to the bargaining problem in [35] . Recently, the Nash social welfare is captured by a family of the generalized (power) mean function [38] with an exponent τ :
In particular,
, which is the limit of A τ ([M]) as τ goes to zero.
In order to study the trade-offs between efficiency and fairness for Nash social welfare, we extend the treatment for its properties. Two other well-studied functions captured by A τ ([M]) include: (i) the egalitarian (i.e., max-min) objective when τ → −∞ and (ii) utilitarian (i.e., average) objective when τ = 1 [43] . They correspond to extreme fairness and extreme efficiency, respectively. However, τ → −∞ may cause large inefficiency, such that the total matches in the dating market may be poor. While τ = 1 neglects how unhappy some males might be, causing unfairness such that they can hardly get a match. The Nash social welfare lies between the two extremities and strikes a natural balance. This is because maximizing the geometric mean leads to more balanced recommendations (i.e., fairness), and also takes efficiency into consideration.
Futhermore, [36] presents game-theoretic properties for Nash social welfare, and proves that each allocation with the maximum Nash social welfare is both Pareto optimal (indicating efficiency) and EF1 (i.e., Envy-Freeness up to One Good, indicating fairness).
Maximizing the Nash Social Welfare Reduce maximizing NSW([M]) to (3). Revisit the definition of s (t ) m
in (2), to simplify, we first set a uniform weight parameter for all users, such that α To consider different weight parameters, we set s
m , and introduces
Then we can also reduce the problem to maximize the Nash social welfare into (3) usings
m is a monotone submodular utility function, we can reduce the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare as a special case of online submodular welfare maximization problem if we set s (8) for each user. Note that this setup is reasonable for real-life dating apps. For instance, we set α (t ) m > 1 for the paying users and α (t ) m = 1 for the non-paying users, indicating that the app takes on a higher priority for each paying user. Therefore when we maximize the Nash social welfare in (8), we are prone to first make r 
Thus for a male reaching his match goal, making more match for him will not improve the Nash social welfare any more.
Offline solution. Recent years, designing approximation algorithms to maximize the Nash social welfare attracts lots of research interest. [37] shows that maximizing Nash social welfare for indivisible items with additive utilities is both NP-hard and APX-hard. [39] presents offline approximation algorithms to maximize the Nash social welfare with additive utilities, and [40] further handle the cases with utility caps. However, note that these algorithms apply the Eisenberg-Gale program [44] to achieve a fractional optimal solution, followed by a carefully designed rounding algorithm. Thus they all need the values of all inputs (e.g., w
) in advance and can not be directly applied in the online settings for dating apps.
Discussions on the online solution. It is worth noting that existing work mostly studies the offline solutions to maximize the Nash social welfare, which is not applicable to the dating markets as we discussed in Section 1 for the requirement of online algorithms.
In this work, our contribution is to reduce the Nash social welfare maximization to (3) based on the reductions above, and use Algorithm 1 to get an online solution. In practice, we setũ
m ), where ϵ = 10 −4 or other small values. This is because loд(0) = −∞ and if there exists a male m with a (t ) m = 0, the output is always −∞, hence Algorithm 1 makes no improvements in initial steps. Adding a small ϵ will tackle this dilemma, letting Algorithm 1 make improvements in each iteration.
DATA-DRIVEN EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In this section, we conduct evaluations based on the combined models and techniques discussed above.
Evaluation Setups
We first describe the dataset configuration for our evaluations. We use the distribution based on the user's swiping data from an online dating app during one week in a small region. We also normalize the number of matches in our evaluation like what we do in Section 3.2. There are about 3, 800 (i.e., M = 3, 800) male active users 4 and 1, 700 (i.e., F = 1, 700) female active users using the app. We partition the male users in [M] into two user groups, with [M npu ] denoting the M npu non-paying users, and [M pay ] denoting the M pay paying users. We define the paying rate γ = M pay M , and we calculate γ ≈ 0.26 based on the dataset we use. We setup uniform match goal for the male users in each group, using д pay to denote the match goal for each paying user all the time (i.e., д
and д npu for the match goal of each non-paying user. We set д npu = 7, and use η = д pay д npu to capture the goal gap between the paying and non-paying users. We can change η to adjust the added value for premium services, and increasing η will decrease the fairness of the market.
The preference prediction scores (i.e., p
) come from the backend recommendation system of the app. Then we calculate each match score (i.e., w
) and estimate the mean of a match score (i.e., E w ). Deriving from the system, we get E w = 0.05. To measure the ratio between the supply (i.e., expected matches from females' swipes) and demand (i.e., sum of match goals for all males), we define Ψ (t ) [M ] as the expected overall happiness for the males in the market at round t. We calculate the value of Ψ (t ) [M ] by dividing the total expected matches achieved by the total match goals for all males:
We have Ψ (t ) [M ] ∈ (0, 1), as the limited capacities for females make it difficult to reach each male's match goal. The value of Ψ (t ) [M ] also varies over time. In our traces, the value of Ψ (t ) [M ] is mostly in [0.3, 0.7] for various market configurations, and 0.5 is a good estimation for common cases.
Performance Metrics
To design better online algorithm using Algorithm 1, we may try different monotone submodular utility functions and parameters. Therefore we need a set of performance metrics (i.e., indicators), each of which is independent of the utility functions and parameters, to evaluate both the efficiency and fairness of the market. Efficiency indicators. We use the uniform happiness indicators to measure the efficiency of the market. For each male m ∈ [M], his uniform happiness (i.e., denoted as h 
m , which implies the ratio of satisfied users in the dating market. In the same way, we also define the happiness indicator for paying users (i.e., H ) and for non-paying users (i.e., H
). 4 If a user logs in and swipes at least once, then we count him/her as an active user.
Fairness Indicators. To evaluate the overall fairness for the male users, we define the match fairness (i.e., J (t ) [M ] ) and impression fairness (i.e.,J (t ) [M ] ) based on Jain's fairness index [45] . The metric indicates the fairness for the number of matches for each male and the cardinality of each male's impression set. Jain's index provides a promising system-level overview of the fairness, which is both easy to compute (i.e., has an explicit form) and normalized (i.e., ranges in [0, 1]). Therefore it is more appropriate to our model than other fairness indicators such as Gini coefficient [46] , max-min fairness [45] , or α-fairness [45] . Based on the definition of Jain's index, we calculate J (t ) [M ] andJ (t ) [M ] :
Choosing the Utility Function
Different utility functions imply various trade-offs between efficiency and fairness. However, since the match goal in each group varies, if we recommend male m ∈ [M npu ] and m ′ ∈ [M pay ] to female f with w
, the increment in r m ′ varies, and therefore the marginal utility may be biased. To eliminate the bias, we introduce the indifferent coefficient (i.e., denoted as β), which depends on the utility function u and the goal gap λ, but is independent of achieved matches a 
and we define β as the indifferent coefficient of u and η.
While β indicates the same accelerated speed for marginal utility gained for different user groups, note that not every monotone submodular function has an indifferent coefficient. For instance, the tanh function (i.e., u(r ) = tanh(r )) does not have an indifferent coefficient. It is easy to verify that of power functions (i.e., u(r ) = r τ , ∀r ∈ [0, +∞)) with exponent τ ∈ (0, 1] are all monotone submodular with β = η τ . Additionally, the logarithmic utility function (i.e., u(r ) = loд(r ), reduced from the Nash social welfare) has a consistent indifferent coefficient β = 1. have the same accelerated speed to get a match. In practice, to make the premium services more valuable, the app needs to help the paying users get a match more quickly, otherwise, it is hard for a paying user to reach his match goal with the same speed. Therefore we introduce the priority parameter for the paying users (i.e., λ), indicating the level of accelerated speed for paying users, comparing to the non-paying users. Then we set α part), and the other component is the priority, measuring the level of privileges to the paying users (i.e., the tunable parameter). In practice, we can dynamically adjust the value of λ to strike a good balance between the happiness for non-paying and paying users, (i.e., like tuning a hyperparameter in machine learning algorithms). We will show the details about how to tune it in Section 6.4. Evaluate the functions. Then we evaluate a set of monotone submodular utility functions, where each of them has an indifferent coefficient β. We choose Linear (i.e., u(r ) = r ), Sqrt (i.e., u(r ) = r 1 2 ), Cbrt (i.e., u(r ) = r 1 3 ), and NSW (i.e., u(r ) = loд(r )), as well as these functions incorporating with utility caps, (i.e., denoted as Linear-cap, Sqrt-cap, Cbrt-cap, and NSW-cap).
To show the performance of different utility functions, we fix η = 3, λ = 3, and vary the value of Ψ (t ) [M ] ∈ (0, 1), to evaluate the results with various supply-demand conditions. For overall happiness and non-paying users' happiness, both NSW and NSW-cap perform well and NSW beats all the other functions without utility caps. As NSW and NSW-cap care more about the overall happiness, especially the non-paying users, sometimes they do not perform well on the happiness for paying users. This is also because λ = 3 is not an appropriate parameter, and we show how to choose the best λ under different η and Ψ (t ) [M ] in Section 6.4. Figure 3 (a) and Figure 3 (b) demonstrate the performance for fairness. We see that NSW beats all the other functions on impression fairnessJ (t ) [M ] . For match fairness J (t ) [M ] , NSW-cap beats all the other functions, and NSW beats the other functions without utility caps.
Parameters and Equilibriums
From the results above, we select NSW and NSW-cap to further evaluate how to select appropriate parameters. Tuning the priority parameter λ. We first fix Ψ (t ) [M ] = 0.5 and η = 3. To capture how λ impacts the priority for the paying users in reality, comparing to the expected goal gap η, we introduce the deviation factor δ , denoting the real gap (i.e., for a (t ) m ) between paying and non-paying users divided by η.
For NSW (i.e., Figure 5 (a)), easy to find that the fairness indicators both go down when λ increases. A good value for λ is around 5, where δ ≈ 1, and the values of H (t ) [M ] ,
are almost equal (i.e., around 0.64). This interesting phenomenon shows an equilibrium (i.e., when λ = λ * ) between non-paying users and paying users, where the three happiness indicators reach around an equilibrium happiness (i.e., denoted as H * ). The equilibrium provides a promising selection of λ (i.e., λ * ), as when λ < λ * , the paying users are not satisfied. Additionally, when λ > λ * , the happiness of non-paying users drops faster than the happiness of paying users can increase.
For NSW-cap (i.e., Figure 5 (b)), we also find the equilibrium when λ ≈ 6 with δ ≈ 1 and H * ≈ 0.66, indicating that 66% of both the non-paying and paying users are happy, which is better than the equilibrium happiness of NSW. Finding equilibriums. Then we find the equilibriums under different configurations (i.e., Ψ (t ) [M ] and η). We show the results in Table 1 (NSW) and Table 2 (NSW-cap). When we fix the value of η, increasing Ψ (t ) [M ] will result in higher equilibriums for both λ * and H * . This is because improving the supply (i.e., total capacities of females) will make it easy to get a match for each user, so as to improve the happiness indicators. Furthermore, since non-paying user can get a match more easily, we need to raise λ * to make δ ≈ 1. Additionally, when we fix the value of Ψ (t ) [M ] , we see that a larger η will increase λ * . While increasing η leads to a more imbalanced market, the fairness indicators and H * both go down, as non-paying users will get less match and therefore unsatisfied.
Evaluation of the Performance Gains
In this section, we evaluate the performance gains of using Nash social welfare maximization (i.e., NSW and NSW-cap). From the dataset and the differences between paying and non-paying in the region, we calculate that Ψ (t ) [M ] = 0.5, η = 3, and д pay = η · д npu = 21. By the definitions in (11) and (12), we calculate that the match fairness for the males in the dataset is 0.297, and the impression fairness is 0.342 by using Jain's fairness indicators.
We then plot the match distribution for our dataset (Figure 4(a) ), as well as for the result of NSW (Figure 4(b) ) and NSW-cap (Figure 4(c) ). The x-axis is the number of matches, and the y-axis is the population ratio given a fixed number of matches. We also zoom in the x-axis to {0, 1, 2, · · · , 24}, as д npu = 7 and д pay = 21, and the population ratio is very small when the matches exceed д pay .
For NSW-cap, the match fairness can improve by 98.7% to 0.59 comparing to the matches of the dataset, and the impression fairness increases 81.3%. Furthermore, we estimate that the average number of matches of the males will increase 32.0% for NSW-cap by using H * divided by Ψ (t ) [M ] . From Figure 4 (c), we can observe two peaks of population ratios for 7 (i.e., д npu ) and 21 matches (i.e., д pay ), and also find that the population ratio becomes 0 when the number of matches exceeds 21. These are all caused by the utility caps.
For NSW (i.e., without introducing the utility caps), it increases 68.4% of the match fairness and 28.0% of the average number of matches, which underperforms the NSW-cap. Whereas it increases the impression fairness by 90.1%, which outperforms the NSW-cap. Furthermore, as NSW does not introduce the utility caps, we do not see clear peaks at д npu and д pay from Figure 4 (b).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Modern mobile dating applications provide appealing double opt-in design to make the match making simple and enjoyable. We strongly believe that a better trade-off between the efficiency and fairness of the dating markets can further improve the users' satisfactions, removing the frustration when a user can not obtain a match or his desired number of matches. This paper focuses on the discussion on designing and implementing efficient and fair online dating markets. We discuss the submodularity and leverage the Nash social welfare to trade off between the two objectives through both theoretical analysis and empirical studies.
This work leads to many open questions to future directions to build a more efficient and fair online dating market: 1) We have not discussed the uncontrollable factors affecting the fairness in this work, and we can classify the users based on their attractiveness levels, and design better recommendation algorithms for each level of users. 2) We mentioned that the females' retention rate is not much sensitive to the number of matches, and we want to design better algorithms or policies to improve the females' retention rate.
